Abstract. The computable model theory of modal logic was initiated by Suman Ganguli and Anil Nerode in [4] . They use an effective Henkin-type construction to effectivize various completeness theorems from classical modal logic. This construction has the feature of only producing models whose frames can be obtained by adding edges to a tree digraph. Consequently, this construction cannot prove an effective version of a well-known completeness theorem which states that every S4.3.1-theory has a model whose accessibility relation is a linear order of order type ω. We prove an effectivization of that theorem by means of a new construction adapted from that of Ganguli and Nerode.
Introduction
First-order modal logic has a rich model theory [2, 6] and is of considerable interest in philosophy [3] , linguistics [7] , and mathematics and computer science [6] . In view of these considerations, modal logic is an attractive candidate for a program of research in computable model theory. This program of research was initiated by Ganguli and Nerode in [4] , who proved effective versions not only of the standard modal completeness theorem but of several of the variations of the completeness theorem unique to modal logic which guarantee for each decidable theory of a specified class a decidable model of a specified class. Namely, they proved the following theorems:
• every consistent, decidable theory has a decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable T-theory has a reflexive decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable K4-theory has a transitive decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable S4-theory has a reflexive and transitive decidable model; • every consistent, decidable K5-theory has a transitive and Euclidean decidable model; and
• every consistent, decidable S5-theory has a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric decidable model. (See Definition 2.7 for the definition of these classes of theories and the classes of models they are intended to describe.) In addition, Ganguli and Nerode proved that their Henkin-type construction is robust in the following ways: the theorems remain true whether decidability of models is taken to require the decidability of truth or the decidability of global truth (simultaneous truth in every world), and they remain true whether the models are taken to have varying domains, constant domains, or monotonic domains. However, the construction in every case builds a branching tree of worlds to serve as the frame of the decidable model; the specialized theorems enumerated above are obtained by effectively adding edges to the accessibility relation (see Definition 2.1). This raises the question of whether these Henkin-type constructions are topologically robust, that is, whether a Henkin-type construction can be carried out to prove effective completeness theorems involving models whose accessibility relation cannot be obtained by adding edges to a branching tree.
We prove that in fact a Henkin-type construction, suitably modified, can be used to prove an effective completeness theorem involving models whose accessibility relations does not branch at all, yielding the following new theorem. This paper is organized as follows. In §2.1 we we give a concise but thorough overview of the modal logic necessary to our proof. In §2.2 we will introduce the system S4.3.1, including an exposition of its model theory which to our knowledge has never appeared previously. In particular, we correct a longstanding error due to Prior [9] . In §3 we prove Theorem 1.1. The proof depends on a Henkin-type construction which produces linear models of order type ω. The objects defined at each finite stage of the construction will be finite structures which approximate a modal model in the same way that finite conjunctions approximate the diagram of a classical first-order model in the classical Henkin construction. Because modal operators quantify over possible worlds in much the same way that first-order quantifiers quantify over elements in the domain, we will have to introduce two sorts of Henkin witnesses: elements of the domain to witness existential sentences, as in the classical construction; and possible worlds to witness possible sentences (i.e. sentences of the form ♦θ). Since we wish to construct linear models, we will need to take care that the worlds we introduce as this sort of Henkin witness maintain the linearity of the structure; that is, as noted above, that the accessibility relation does not branch.
Preliminaries
2.1. Modal Logic. We begin with a standard description of first-order modal logic. For a detailed introduction, see for example [2] .
2.1.1. Syntax. A first-order modal language L is obtained by adding to a classical first-order language L − the modal symbols ♦ and . 1 The atomic formulae are 1 For simplicity, we omit equality from the language. The only modification that needs to be made to our construction if equality is present is the modification one would expect in any those of L − , and the well-formed formulae are obtained by adding to the standard recursive definition the rule:
• if φ is a wff, then so are ♦φ and φ. Informally, ♦φ asserts that φ is possibly true while φ asserts that φ is necessarily true. The sense of the words "possibly" and "necessarily" can vary greatly (see for example [2] ) but is standardly formalized by a possible worlds semantics, given below. In terms of possible worlds, ♦φ means that there exists a possible world where φ is true, while φ means that φ is true at every possible world. The accessibility relation is meant to formalize the idea that one world is possible from another: (w, w ′ ) ∈ R means that w ′ is possible or "accessible" from w. In keeping with standard conventions, we identify a possible world with the set of sentences true at that world.
Definition 2.2. A (constant domain) Kripke model
2 is a quadruple (W, R, D, I), where (W, R) is a Kripke frame, D is a nonempty set (the domain of the model), and I is an interpretation of the relations and constants of L in D having the following properties:
• for c a constant symbol, I(c) ∈ D;
• for w ∈ W and P an n-ary predicate symbol,
This allows us more easily to state the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Truth at a World).
If w is a world in the Kripke model M , we write (M, w) φ when φ is true at the world w in M . Truth is defined inductively on the structure of φ:
If T is a set of sentences, we write M T to mean that M φ for each φ ∈ T .
Definition 2.5. We say that T entails φ, and write T φ, if for every Kripke model M T , M φ.
Henkin construction: the domain of the constructed model should be taken to be the set of Henkin witnesses modulo equality. For the details of this modification in the modal logic case, see [4] . 2 We consider only constant domain models, but the construction we give may be adapted to varying domain models and to monotonic domain models using, mutatis mutandis, the modifications for those cases described in [4] .
2.1.3.
Deduction. The standard system of deduction in first-order modal logic is normal modal logic, denoted K, which consists of all the inference rules and axiom schema of first-order logic, 3 plus the following rule and scheme:
• Rule of Necessitation: if φ is a theorem then φ is a theorem.
• Axiom of Distribution: (φ → ψ) → ( φ → ψ). The soundness and completeness theorems hold between the semantics of Kripke models given above and this deductive system.
Theories.
Definition 2.6. A theory is a deductively closed set of sentences.
Modal theories are classified according to whether they contain certain axiom schema (or, equivalently, are closed under a new notion of deduction obtained by including those axiom schema as logical axioms).
Definition 2.7. We define some standard classes of theories.
• K-theories are just theories, with no additional axioms required.
• T-theories contain the scheme φ → φ.
• K4-theories contain the scheme φ → φ.
• K5-theories contain the scheme ♦φ → ♦φ.
• S4-theories contain the schemes of both T and K4.
• S5-theories contain the schemes of S4 and K5.
These classes of theories are usually referred to as systems. As stated in the introduction, effective completeness theorems for each of these systems were proved in [4] .
2.2. The System S4.3.1. Arthur Prior [8] introduced the modal system D to describe discrete time, i.e. time seen as a linear sequence of moments such that for each moment, there is an earliest (if any) future moment and a latest (if any) past moment. Such a conception of time, and hence the corresponding modal logic, has proven useful in computer science (see e.g. [5] ). System D was later renamed to system S4.3.1 by Sobociński [11] . As the name D presently designates another modal system, the system of discrete time has retained Sobociński's nomenclature. System S4.3.1 is obtained from K by adding the following axiom schema:
Given axiom schema T and 4, axiom scheme D2 describes linear models, i.e. models whose accessibility relation is a linear order; given the previous three schema, N1 describes discrete models, i.e. models whose accessibility relation has the order type of an infinite subset of the integers.
In order to clarify them, we will verify the claims of the preceding paragraph informally. Consider the temporal interpretation of φ as asserting that "φ is now and always will be true," i.e. that φ is true at the present moment and is true at all presently possible future moments. On that reading, we have the following understanding of the axiom schema D2 and N1.
• D2
( φ → ψ) means that whenever φ is forever true, ψ is true; ( ψ → φ) means that whenever ψ is forever true, φ is true. For this to be false at some world (moment) in a transitive, reflexive model, there would need to be a possible future moment w 1 at which φ was forever true while ψ was false, as well as a possible future moment w 2 at which ψ was forever true while φ is false. This is impossible if (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ R or (w 2 , w 1 ) ∈ R, so the accessibility relation cannot be total. So given T and 4, to falsify D2 we require that the accessibility relation not be a linear order.
• N1 ♦ φ → φ means that if sooner or later φ is forever true, then φ is presently true; ( (φ → φ) → φ) means that it is forever true that if whenever φ becomes true it stays true forever, then φ is true. For this to be false at some world in a model whose accessibility relation is a linear order, the following would have to obtain: φ is false, sooner or later φ is forever true, and at every future moment, either φ is true or φ will become true without being forever true. Given that the accessibility relation is a reflexive linear order, this requires that there be in our model a moment (world) at which φ is forever true, but prior to which there is no latest moment at which φ is true and no latest moment at which φ is false. So given T, 4, and D2, to falsify N1 we require a subset of the accessibility relation to be dense.
4
In light of the above considerations, the following theorem is not surprising. The proof of the theorem was first given by Bull [1] using an algebraic semantics for modal logic rather than the now standard Kripke possible world semantics outlined in this paper; Segerberg [10] later supplied a proof using Kripke semantics. Theorem 2.8 (Completeness for S4.3.1). The modal system S4.3.1 is complete with respect to the class of models whose accessibility relation is a linear order of order type ω.
Completeness theorems like this one in modal logic are usually proven using a noneffective canonical model construction. While the usual proof strategy fails in the case of Theorem 2.8 [2] , its proof still relies on the canonical model construction [10] . Moreover, any attempt to effectivize Theorem 2.8 using the effective Henkin construction of [4] fails because that construction produces nonlinear models. In fact, whenever a sentence of the form ♦φ is added to a world w during the construction, a new world w ′ such that (w, w ′ ) ∈ R is added to the model; and if w ′′ is another such world, then (w ′ , w ′′ ) / ∈ R. Therefore in order to effectivize Theorem 2.8, we require a new Henkin construction. We supply such a construction in the next section.
Construction
Recall our goal: to prove that every decidable S4.3.1-theory has a decidable model whose accessibility relation is of order type ω. Because we will be referring repeatedly to such models, it is convenient to give them a less cumbersome name. (1) A finite Kripke diagram (FKD) for a modal language L is an ordered pair (W = {w 0 , . . . , w n }, R), where W is a finite set of finite worlds (sets of Lsentences) and R a binary relation on W . A linear FKD is a FKD where
(2) Given a linear FKD D = (W = {w 0 , . . . , w n }, R), define
and define by induction
for 0 ≤ i < n. We say that Ψ D := Ψ 0 is the representing formula of D.
At successive stages of the construction we will extend linear FKDs to larger linear FKDs, with the intention that the desired model can be defined as a limit of this construction. We therefore need to know whether these extensions are "consistent" in the sense that we may in fact define such a limit model. It turns out that the notion of consistency we need our FKDs to have is something a little short of requiring them to embed into a model. The correct notion is supplied in the following definition. (
Given a decidable S4.3.1-theory T , we can determine effectively whether a given linear FKD is T -consistent. This is the import of the next lemma. Before we state the lemma, however, we have need of a new notation. (1) D is T -consistent;
Observe that since T is complete, if we take T to be decidable we can determine effectively whether (2) holds. Proof.
• (1) ⇒ (2). Suppose that D is T -consistent, and let M be a discrete linear model witnessing D by f . The proof proceeds by induction. By hypothesis, (M, f (w n )) φ for each φ ∈ w n , whence (M, f (w n )) Ψ n . Now suppose by way of induction that 0 ≤ i < n and
• (2) ⇒ (1).
Set f (w 0 ) = w. By hypothesis, (M, w) Ψ 0 . Now suppose by way of induction that we have defined
Since by induction (M, f (w i )) Ψ i for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we observe that M witnesses D by f .
It will greatly simplify the description of our construction if we define a notation whereby if D is a FKD, D + { * } denotes the modification of D by adding * to it, in the following precise sense.
is a FKD and φ a sentence in the language of D, define the following notations.
•
where
and where • The two previous notations may be combined:
These notations may be repeated, so that D + {φ ∈ w i , ψ ∈ w j } denotes the FKD obtained from D by adding φ to w D i and ψ to w D j . With this notation in hand, we now begin the construction. Construction 3.7. Let T be a consistent, decidable S4.3.1-theory in a first-order modal language L. Fix a computable set of constants C absent from L and a computable enumeration φ 0 , φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . of sentences in the expanded language L∪C. Let π : N → N × N be a computable enumeration of pairs with the property that for any given pair (i, e) ∈ N×N, there are infinitely many n ∈ N such that π(n) = (i, e).
We •
n i } and update indices from n to n + 1.
• If T l ¬Ψ D , we consider several cases.
} where c j is the least element of C not occurring in D n , and update indices.
• If φ e = ♦θ, we examine the following FKDs in order:
In each case we test whether T l ¬Ψ D , where D is the FKD in question. If this is the case, we set D n+1 = D and update indices from n to n+1. If not, we proceed to the next item in the list. We are guaranteed to obtain a positive result from one of these tests because D n is by induction Tconsistent and T has a discrete linear model.
• Otherwise, we set D n+1 = D n + {φ e ∈ w n i } and update indices. Now we define a Kripke model M = (W, R, D, I):
• and for an n-ary relation symbol P and n-tuplec of elements of C, and any world w i ∈ W ,c ∈ I(w i )(P ) ⇔ P (c) ∈ w i .
Lemma 3.8 (Consistency Lemma). At each stage n of the Construction 3.7, D n is T -consistent.
Proof. The proof is by induction. To say that D 0 is T -consistent is just to say that T is consistent, which holds by hypothesis. Now suppose that we have shown D n to be T -consistent. We consider the possible cases.
• T l ¬Ψ D . In this case, we chose D n+1 = D n + {¬φ e ∈ w • φ e = ∃x θ(x). Then since (M, f (w Then M witnesses D n+1 byf .
• Otherwise, D n+1 = D with and so M witnesses D n+1 by f (subject to updated indices). So D n+1 is T -consistent.
Lemma 3.9 (Closure Lemma). Let T , C, M , etc. be as in Construction 3.7. Then for each w i ∈ W :
(1) For each e, exactly one of φ e or ¬φ e is in w i .
(2) (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ w i iff φ ∈ w i and ψ ∈ w i . (3) ∃x θ(x) ∈ w i iff tehere is some c ∈ C such that θ(c) ∈ w i . (4) ♦θ ∈ w i iff there is some w j ∈ W such that (w i , w j ) ∈ R and θ ∈ w j . (5) θ ∈ w i iff θ ∈ w j for every w j ∈ W such that (w i , w j ) ∈ R. (6) T ⊆ w i . Proof.
(1) Let n = (i, e) be such that w n i ∈ W n . By Construction 3.7, either φ e ∈ w n+1 i or ¬φ e ∈ w n+1 i and so one or the other is in w i . Now suppose by way of contradiction that φ e , ¬φ e ∈ w i . Then φ e , ¬φ e ∈ w n i for some n. But then D n is not T -consistent, contrary to the Consistency Lemma.
